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1 Introduction
In an effort to reduce operational costs, the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT)
decided to change the design of their monthly procurement auctions for road construction
contracts in March of 2002. Until that date, ODOT auctioned off the contracts in two
separate sessions on a single day, with roughly one half of the contracts being auctioned off
simultaneously in the morning (AM) and the remaining contracts in the afternoon (PM). All
submitted bids in AM auctions were publicly revealed before PM bidding. Since March 2002,
all projects are auctioned off simultaneously in one single session. We examine empirically
the impact of the change in auction format on participation and bidding behavior focusing
on asphalt projects.
In a recent related study, De Silva et al. (2007) examined timing effects of a switch
from a sequential to a simultaneous format to find no statistically significant difference in
bidding behavior that could be attributed to the change. Notably, this empirical analysis was
conducted on an aggregation of decisions over a large variety of project categories—ranging
from projects with a predominant private cost component to projects with primarily common
costs. As suggested by theoretical and empirical investigation of bidding and participation
decisions in Milgrom and Weber (1982), Goeree and Offerman (2003) and De Silva et al.
(2008) behavior is markedly different across project types. As such, it becomes more urgent
that policy recommendations are tailored to general characteristics of projects. Potential
economies of scope and informational differences between a multi-round and a single-round
format are bound to have a differential effect on bidding behavior across project categories.
In this study, we focus on asphalt paving projects that have primarily private costs (Bajari
and Ye (2003), De Silva et al. (2008), Porter and Zona (1993)). We use about 6,000 bids
submitted by construction firms in Oklahoma and Texas over the period from March 2000
to August 2003 to analyze bidding strategies. Throughout the entire period investigated,
the Texas Department of Transportation (TxDOT) auctioned all its contracts in two lettings
every single month. We use the road construction auction data from Texas as a control group
against which to mirror eventual changes in Oklahoma. Our results suggest that the design
change has not induced a change in auction participation. There is no significant change in
the number of plan holders (the firms that express interest by buying a plan to examine the
details of a project description), their bid submission probability, and the number of actual
bidders per project. We do, however, find a significant impact on bidding behavior; bidding
has become less competitive. All in all, the shift to a single-round auction has caused an
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increase in the procurement costs for asphalt projects.
The comparison of bidding behavior and revenue between multi-round and single-round
auctions within the independent private value (IPV) setting is limited in the theoretical
literature. Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) consider an IPV framework and focus on synergistic
effects. Their analysis applies to circumstances were some bidders have an additive value
(synergy) from winning two units of an object and some bidders are single unit buyers.
They find that a sequential auction generates higher (lower) revenue than the simultaneous
one when synergistic effects are small (large). In Albano et al. (2001) on the other hand
simultaneous auctions outperform sequential auctions if there are many competitors trying to
take advantage of synergies.1 Feng and Chatterjee (2005) explore within an IPV framework
the question of whether an auctioneer can benefit by dividing a stock of items into two
identical lots and auctioning off the lots sequentially (in two periods), rather than selling
them all in one session. Considering impatient bidders with a unitary demand, they showed
that it may not always be better to sell all items in one period. Which auction format performs
better is largely determined by the relationship between the number of items sold and the
number of bidders competing. The sequential auction format produces higher revenues when
competition intensity is low. When buyers are impatient, a sequential sale can be more
profitable for the seller as it stimulates competition among forward-looking bidders. Milgrom
and Weber’s (2000) work in an affiliated values model suggests that sequential auctions can
generate more revenues than simultaneous auctions, due to “informational effects.” These
informational effects can be more persistent in common cost settings (Hausch (1986)).
Construction firms often compete for multiple projects at a time and may realize economies
of scope depending on the location and project similarities. Even though a fraction of costs
may be common to all firms and informational effects may play a role in the bidding process,
asphalt paving projects have primarily private costs. These projects absorbed 58.7% of the
road construction budgets of Oklahoma and Texas (or $5.88 billion dollars) during the period
of analysis but attracted a relatively low number of potential bidders (3 to 4) per auction.
Our analysis takes into account all these factors that are relevant to the auction outcome and
standard in road construction and examines their significance in the selection of an auction
format.
1Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) used a parameterized example with two bidders, one global (experiencing
synergies from undertaking multiple projects) and one local (interested in one item) and provide a numerical
solution. They noted that: “A general comparison of the revenues from the simultaneous auction, the sequential
auction, and the combinatorial auction appears to be rather difficult, even with a single global bidder.” Albano
et al. (2001) extend the parameterized example of Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) by using two global bidders.
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Section 2 offers a detailed description of the data set that is followed by the empirical
analysis in Section 3. A discussion and concluding remarks are included in Section 4.
2 Data
We use data from the Oklahoma Department of Transportation (ODOT) and the Texas
Department of Transportation (TxDOT) on auctions that took place between January 1997
and August 2003.2 As mentioned earlier, ODOT decided in March of 2002 to start offering all
contracts simultaneously instead of holding two sessions on a single day. This unique natural
experiment allowed us to evaluate the impact of the change in format on bidder participation
and bidding behavior in ODOT road construction auctions compared to a control group. Our
control group consists of auctions held by TxDOT in which a uniform policy of holding two
sessions within a month was in effect throughout our period of analysis.
In both states, the auction process is similar. All bidders learn the location and the
detailed project description, the estimated number of days to complete the project, the engi-
neer’s cost estimate, and the list of contractors who purchased plans (plan holders) at least
four weeks before an auction. At the conclusion of each session, the bids submitted by each
bidder are revealed and the winner is announced. Table 8 in Appendix A provides a detailed
definition for each of the variables used in the study.
We are interested in examining the participation and bidding behavior of bidders who
bid before and after March 2002. We focus on auctions of asphalt projects that are typically
having a strong private cost component. We utilize data from March 2000 until August
2003 in the empirical analysis.3 Data from January 1997 to March 2000 are used to create
variables on bidder history, potential to gain from synergies, potential rivals’ strength and
capacity commitment.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for asphalt projects in Oklahoma and Texas. For
both states, the number of plan holders and number of bidders per auction have increased
after March 2002. However, data indicate that there are more asphalt projects in Texas than
in Oklahoma. Also there are about 60% more plan holders and bidders per auction in Texas
asphalt projects. When considering the average relative bids (the bid relative to the engineer’s
cost estimate) and winning bids for asphalt projects, we notice an increase in those bids at
2The data were gathered from bid reports provided by ODOT and TxDOT.
3Prior to March 2000 the policy on the release of information related to the engineering cost estimate was
different in Texas and Oklahoma. Our data analysis window spans from March 2000 until August 2003 thus
avoiding complications that could arise from multiple contemporary policy considerations.
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the mean level in Oklahoma relative to Texas. In the next section, we analyze empirically
the participation patterns and bidding behavior.
Oklahoma Texas
Before March Since March Before March Since March
Variable 2002 2002 2002 2002
Number of awarded projects 173 130 744 433
Number of plan holders 826 689 4754 3258
Number of bids submitted 487 429 3211 2048
Average number of plan holders 3.988 4.469 6.340 7.499
per project (1.864) (2.113) (2.989) (3.274)
Average number of bidders 2.636 2.962 4.266 4.704
per project (1.334) (1.241) (1.993) (2.217)
Average relative value of bids 1.043 1.064 1.046 1.019
(.206) (.184) (.194) (.219)
Average relative value of .949 .982 .951 .925
winning bids (.137) (.144) (.153) (.193)
Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 1: Summary statistics of asphalt projects auctioned in Oklahoma and Texas.
3 Empirical model and results
In this section, we present two approaches on how to measure the differential impact of
the two auction formats on procurement costs. First, we use a panel-data difference-in-
differences approach. This approach provides flexibility in estimation allowing controls for
format, bidder heterogeneity including potential synergies from existing workload, auction
characteristics, rival characteristics and business conditions. It is a straightforward way to
model the format change allowing for a wide range of robustness checks. Our second approach
is to use the nonparametric regression technique proposed by Racine and Li (2004) to provide
the predicted distributions of bids in Oklahoma before and after the format change and
compare them to Texas. Racine and Li (2004) allows for nonparametric estimation with
continuous and categorical variables using the kernel method of density estimation rather
than the conventional frequency estimation process used to handle categorical variables.4
4This smoothing method has been shown to have significant efficiency gains over the conventional nonpara-
metric and semiparametric approaches for finite samples.
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3.1 Reduced-form estimation
In order to understand better the patterns of bidding in auctions held by the Oklahoma
Department of Transportation, we present a set of reduced-form regressions that show how
participation and bidding varies across the two periods. In addition, to capture better the
effect of the format change we compare bidding behavior in Oklahoma and Texas. In Texas,
there was no change in the timing of the bid letting for the entire sample period. In Oklahoma,
there was a distinct change in the format as described above. We model this change by
classifying our auctions into two distinct time periods: before March 2002 (before the format
change) and after March 2002. We then estimate a difference-in-differences (DID) model that
allows for differential effects across the two periods.
Our basic econometric specification is:
yiast = α0 + β1Ds + β2At + β3(Ds ×At) + x
′
iastγ + ǫiast, (1)
where the unit of observation is firm i bidding in auction a in state s in time period t. Since we
are interested in examining bidder participation and bidding behavior we use the number of
plan holders, number of bidders, relative bid, and relative winning bid as our main dependent
variables. The independent variables can be classified into five main groups: format controls,
auction characteristics, bidder characteristics, rival characteristics and business environment
characteristics. In this specification, the βs measure the change in bidding that occurs between
Texas and Oklahoma across the two periods of analysis. The variable Ds takes the value of
1 if the bid was observed in Oklahoma. At takes the value of 1 for bids observed after the
format change. The coefficient on Ds, β1, measures the average difference in bidding between
Oklahoma and Texas auctions. The coefficient β2 captures the average difference in bidding
before and after the format change. The coefficient β3 measures the change in bidding in
Oklahoma auctions compared to Texas auctions in the period after the format change. Our
main interest is on β3, expressed in this DID model by:
(E[ y |x, Ds=1, At=1 ]− E[ y |x, Ds=0, At=1 ] )
− (E[ y |x, Ds=1, At=0 ]− E[ y |x, Ds=0, At=0 ] )
(2)
where the first two terms (E[ y |x, Ds =1, At =1 ] − E[ y |x, Ds =0, At =1 ] ) represent the
difference between the expected value of bids in Oklahoma and Texas after the format change.
The last two terms (E[ y |x, Ds =1, At =0 ] − E[ y |x, Ds =0, At =0 ] ) isolate the expected
difference in bids across the two states before the format change. Since ODOT’s goal was
to reduce the operational cost, not to increase the construction costs to the public, we are
interested to examine if β3 turns out to be non-positive and if it is statistically significant.
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All variables used in our analysis are described in Table 8 in Appendix A. There are three
auction-level variables: the number of plan holders, the potential number of rivals, and the
log of number of days to complete the project. The first two variables control for differences
in competition across auctions.
In all models we include variables on bidder characteristics to capture cost heterogeneity
across bidders. They are measures on capacity utilization rate and firm’s distance to a project.
As a bidder’s capacity utilization rises or as a firm’s distance to a project increases, we
expect lower participation and higher level of bidding. Further, we include a dummy variable
indicating if a firm is bidding in a division where there is an ongoing project, to control for
any geographical synergies with existing projects defining a firm’s workload.
We control for rivals’ characteristics using three variables. First, we construct the average
winning percentage of all rival plan holders in an auction. This variable controls for rivals’
toughness. We expect firms to bid more aggressively when they face a set of tough rivals.
Then, as in Bajari and Ye (2003), we include the rivals’ minimum distance to the project
and the minimum backlog of the rivals. These variables are also used to control for rival cost
heterogeneity.5
Finally, we use three variables that control for the business environment: (1) the monthly
variation in the amount of projects being let, (2) the monthly unemployment rate, and (3) the
monthly building permits. The first variable measures the real volume of projects auctioned
off in each state in each month. The aggregate real volume of projects auctioned off in a
month in a state will vary due to seasonal factors and budgetary conditions.
3.1.1 Difference-in-differences results
Table 2 presents the entry and winning probabilities conditional upon entry. Results from
both tables indicate that generally the participation of bidders and winning probabilities have
not changed after the format change. The key parameter of interest is β3 that measures the
difference in entry between Oklahoma and Texas auctions in the period after March 2002.
We see no difference in entry decisions in Oklahoma across the periods compared to Texas.
Results also indicate that there is an inverse relationship between the entry and winning
probabilities and the number of rivals.6
5See also Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) and De Silva et al. (2008).
6Since firms are observed repeatedly, the observations may not be independent. In this case standard errors
can be underestimated. Therefore, we report standard errors that are clustered by firms as suggested by
Moulton (1990).
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Probability Probability of winning
of bidding conditional on bidding
Variable (1) (2)
Oklahoma Bids (β1) -.107** .034
(.046) (.040)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.015 -.048
(.043) (.044)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .076 -.012
(.056) (.057)
Log of Engineering Estimate .012 .004
(.010) (.008)
Number of rivals (plan holders) -.028** -.038**
(.005) (.005)
Oklahoma number of rivals after March 2002 -.022 -.002
(.014) (.011)
Number of rivals after March 2002 .012** .005
(.005) (.007)
Log number of days to complete the project -.018 .002
(.014) (.011)
Firm bidding on a division where there is an .142** .052**
ongoing project (.017) (.014)
Bidders capacity utilized .062** -.026
(.028) (.021)
Bidders distance to the project location -.017** -.025**
(.007) (.005)
Average rivals winning to plan holder ratio -.238* -.427**
(.143) (.118)
Closest rival’s distance to the project location .014** .023**
(.004) (.004)
Rivals minimum backlog .001 .001
(.001) (.001)
Seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate -.006 .001
(.013) (.012)
Three month average of relative real value of -.079** .020
engineer’s estimates (.027) (.027)
Three month average of relative number of -.299** .135
building permits (.114) (.113)
Number of Observations 9430 6175
Wald χ2 381.77 316.99
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
All regressions include a constant term and 11 monthly dummy variables.
Table 2: Probit regression results.
When considering other controls we see that geographic synergies matter for entry and
winning. If a firm has an ongoing project in the same location then the probability to enter
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and win increases. When a firm faces a rival with a significant record of success in the past
or when a firm’s distance to the location of a project increases, the probability of entry and
winning decreases. However, as the closest rival’s distance to the project location increases
the bidders are more likely to enter and win.
Table 3 presents the results for relative bid regressions. Our main result indicates that
the change the ‘timing’ of lettings has adversely affected the relative bids for projects with
Relative bids
Variable (1) (2)
Oklahoma Bids (β1) -.007 -.001
(.012) (.012)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.066** -.071**
(.012) (.012)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .057** .060**
(.015) (.015)
Number of bidders -.009**
(.001)
Number of plan holders -.004**
(.001)
Log number of days to complete the project .001 .001
(.004) (.004)
Firm bidding on a division where there is an -.029** -.027**
ongoing project (.005) (.005)
Bidders capacity utilized .016 .015
(.009) (.009)
Bidders distance to the project location .003 .002
(.002) (.002)
Average rivals winning to plan holder ratio -.274** -.268**
(.049) (.050)
Closest rival’s distance to the project location -.009** -.009**
(.002) (.002)
Rivals minimum backlog .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate -.005 -.003
(.006) (.006)
Three month average of relative real value of .048** .052**
engineer’s estimates (.012) (.012)
Three month average of relative number of .227** .241**
building permits (.054) (.054)
Number of Observations 6175 6175
Adjusted R2 .037 .032
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
All regressions include a constant term and 11 monthly dummy variables.
Table 3: Regression results.
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large independent private cost components. We estimate our models using the number of
bidders in one specification and the number of plan holders in the other. Columns (1) and
(2) of Table 3 provide these estimates. In private value auctions (asphalt projects) both
the number of bidders and plan holders have a negative effect on the bid level. We also
estimated the models with firm fixed effects to control for bidder heterogeneity. Naturally we
included only bidders that have submitted multiple bids. The results are reported in Table 9
(Appendix B) and show consistency.
When considering other variables, bidders who have ongoing projects in the same division
bid more aggressively while capacity constrained bidders bid less aggressively. As the distance
to the project location increase bidders tend to bid less aggressively. The estimate on the
rivals’ past winning to plan holder ratio indicates that when bidders face tough rivals they
tend to bid more aggressively.
Table 4 reports the winning bid regression results. The main qualitative finding is that
winning bids for asphalt projects have increased after the change in format. Less aggressive
bidding behavior and unchanged participation have led to a significant increase in winning
bids and thus construction costs to the public. Once more we estimated the model with
firm fixed effects to control for unobservable bidder heterogeneity in Table 10. This time we




Oklahoma Bids (β1) -.023 -.013
(.015) (.016)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.047** -.055**
(.020) (.020)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .078** .081**
(.021) (.021)
Number of bidders Yes No
Number of plan holders No Yes
Firm bidding on a division where there is an Yes Yes
ongoing project
Number of Observations 1480 1480
Adjusted R2 .092 .063
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
All regressions are similar to runs in Table 3.
Table 4: Regression results.
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The OLS and fixed effects results above indicate that on average bidders bid less aggres-
sively in Oklahoma after the format change compared to Texas. In our analysis of bids, we
have considered differences in expected values. We will now show that the level of bids is con-
sistently higher in Oklahoma than in Texas after the format change not only in expectation
but across the bidding distributions. We can thus provide evidence that the less aggressive
bidding behavior after the format change is not due to a truncation of the distribution of bids
at the lower end but due to effects that are persistent at every level. In order to investigate
this issue, we use the quantile regression technique introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1982).
We restrict estimation to three quantiles: 0.25, 0.50, and 0.75 and estimate the relative bid
and winning bid models.7 The results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Our main finding is
that after policy change Oklahoma bidders bid less aggressively by 4.7% and win with 6.1%
higher bids. We then test the difference across the three quantiles from the two models in
Columns (1) and (2) in both Tables 5 and 6. Our results from Table 5 indicate that there is no
statistically significant difference in the estimate of β3 across the quantiles, but all coefficients
are statistically significant within each model signifying a large and persistent difference in
the bidding behavior across the two states after the format change was implemented. The
Relative bids
(1) (2)
Variable / Quantile .25 .50 .75 .25 .50 .75
Oklahoma Bids (β1) -.016 .005 .23 -.015 .008 .034*
(.013) (.012) (.020) (.015) (.016) (.018)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.028** -.040** -.053** -.028** -.045** -.067**
(.012) (.012) (.015) (.015) (.013) (.017)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .067** .047** .043** .063** .047** .058**
(.015) (.015) (.021) (.017) (.018) (.021)
Number of bidders Yes Yes Yes No No No
Number of plan holders No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6175 6175 6175 6175 6175 6175
Pseudo R2 .033 .031 .038 .033 .029 .033
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
All regressions are similar to runs in Table 3.







1) With number of bidders: F(2, 6125) = 1.02
2) With number of plan holders: F(2, 6125) = .66
Table 5: Quantile regression results with large firm effects.
7These models are similar to the ones we used in OLS regressions. In addition, we include large firm




Variable / Quantile .25 .50 .75 .25 .50 .75
Oklahoma Bids (β1) -0.38 -.008 -.011 -.023 .003 .008
(.033) (.019) (.026) (.030) (.024) (.029)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.013 -.021 -.030 -.025 -.026 -.034
(.027) (.021) (.026) (.024) (.025) (.029)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .070** .062** .030 .084** .061** .026
(.032) (.027) (.035) (.028) (.028) (.034)
Number of bidders Yes Yes Yes No No No
Number of plan holders No No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480 1480
Pseudo R2 .072 .067 .080 .063 .053 .061
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
All regressions are similar to runs in Table 4.







1) With number of bidders: F(2, 1430) = .54
2) With number of plan holders: F(2, 1430) = 1566
Table 6: Quantile regression results with large firm effects.
results are qualitatively similar in Table 6 showing statistically significant difference in the
winning bids at the median level and the .25 quantile.
3.1.2 Robustness analysis
Next, we estimate a number of alternative specifications in order to examine the robustness
of our results. While we have employed clustered standard errors throughout the paper to
address the problems of within group correlation raised by Moulton (1990), Bertrand et al.
(2004) raise the point that clustered standard errors are biased downward in panel data if
serial correlation is present. The approach that Bertrand et al. (2004) recommend is to
collapse the data down to pre and post format change and estimate parameters. Therefore,
we aggregate the pre and post March 2002 data by firm. Note that, in this case we require
each firm to be bidding in both periods in order to estimate the models with firm effects. The
first two columns of Table 7 present these results. The results are consistent with the model
reported in Table 3 for asphalt work in terms of sign and statistical significance.
Another issue is whether the format dummy is just picking up an increasing trend in
Oklahoma relative bids over time. To test this possibility we estimate the relative bid model
using only data from the period before the format change and include time variables to
measure the trends in relative bids in both states over this period. These models include
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Pre-relative bids – Time trend Instrumented with
Averaged by period analysis number of plan holders
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oklahoma Bids (β1) .251 .276 -.002 .017 -.006 .034
(.248) (.254) (.116) (.117) (.012) (.053)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.072 -.081 -.067** -.051
(.073) (.071) (.012) (.014)
Oklahoma Bids after .091* .093* .058** .055**
March 2002 (β3) (.050) (.049) (.015) (.018)
Time .002* .003**
(.001) (.001)
Time × Oklahoma Bids .001 .001
(.002) (.002)
Number of bidders Yes No Yes No
Number of plan holders No Yes No Yes
Firm effects Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
First stage instrument
Number of plan holders .539** .513**
(.006) (.008)
Number of Observations 430 430 3650 3650 6175 6108
Adjusted R2 .441 .438 .178 .174 .037 .182
Hausman test (p-value) .240 .367
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
Table 7: Robustness checks.
an overall trend term and the trend term interacted with Oklahoma auctions to test for
differences in trend between both states. Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 contain the results.
The estimated trend terms show no statistically significant difference between Oklahoma and
Texas. Hence, Oklahoma’s relative bids were not trending upward prior to the format change
relative to Texas.
Finally, we allow for endogeneity in the number of bidders and re-estimate the model using
instrumental variable techniques. We instrument the number of bidders with the number of
plan holders.8, 9 The estimates are presented in the last two columns of Table 7. One can see
8See also Haile et al. (2006) for the use of the number of plan holders as an instrument for number of
bidders in procurement auctions.
9The issue of endogenous entry and participation in auctions has received considerable attention in the
theoretical literature (see Samuelson (1985), Levin and Smith (1994), Deltas and Jeitschko (2007), Marmer
et al. (2007) and Palfrey and Pevnitskaya (2008) among others). In the pure private value case, Li and
Zheng (2010) developed and tested an entry and bidding model with important implications. They found
that procurement cost may rise in the presence of endogenous entry because of the fact that a positive “entry
effect” may outweigh the negative “competition effect.” Clearly, the impact of increased potential competition
on bidding behavior depends on the characteristics of the project auctioned off. Despite the rich literature on
endogenous entry, a theoretical or empirical study that compares participation behavior or bidding behavior
13
that there is little difference between these results and the OLS results of Table 3 or the fixed
effects results of Table 9.
3.2 Nonparametric estimation
In this section we estimate the log bids for Oklahoma and Texas before and after the change
in auction format separately using a nonparametric regression technique proposed by Racine
and Li (2004). This estimation technique allows the data to provide a modeling framework for
the relationship among variables applying a kernel method of density estimation to discrete
variables that admit no natural ordering such as the project divisions used here. This method
was shown to have higher predictive power than other conventional approaches in the presence
of categorical variables.
Consider the following empirical model
bi = g(Xi) + µi, (3)
where g(·) has an unknown functional form and Xi represents a set of continuous and dis-




i ) with X
c
i representing the subset of continuous
variables and Xdi the discrete variables.
10 In our case, the continuous variables are the log
number of plan holders, log number of days to complete the project, log of engineering cost
estimate, bidders capacity utilized, bidders distance to the project location, average rivals
winning to plan holder ratio, closest rival’s distance to the project location, rivals minimum
backlog, seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate, three month average of relative real value
of engineer’s estimates and three month average of relative number of building permits. We
treat monthly dummies and project divisions as unordered discrete variables. In addition, we
use a dummy variable for firms bidding in a division where there is an ongoing project. This
variable is commonly introduced across the two states and time periods.
Figures 1 and 2 show the predicted values of bids from Oklahoma and Texas distinguish-
ing between the two time periods. These figures suggest that after the format change the
predicted bids in Oklahoma are less aggressive than before. The bid distribution after the for-
mat change first order stochastically dominates the bid distribution before the format change.
When considering the bid distributions from Texas, no such pattern appears providing con-
sistent supporting evidence to our earlier findings. In fact, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for the
in multi-round auctions with that of single-round auctions is still non-existent.
10Optimal smoothing parameters for g(·) were chosen using the ‘leave-one-out cross-validation’ mechanism
when estimating the fitted values. Bandwidths were chosen using Silverman’s rule of thumb and using triweight
kernels when estimating results.
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equality of distribution functions that was performed led to rejection of the null hypothesis
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Figure 2: Predicted log of bids using nonparametric estimation.
11When estimating predicted values for TX using Racine and Li (2004), we use 500 randomly selected
auctions instead of all 1,177 auctions. With these predicted values we have drawn Figure 2. Converge time
for these 500 auctions using Racine and Li (2004) method was about 4 hours. The relative bids for the period
before and after policy change in the sample are 1.062 (.187) and 1.003 (.182) and statistically not different
from the TX full sample in Table 1. In the sample there were 1287 bids before and 833 bids after policy change.
12We also used the methodology by Haile et al. (2006) to uncover “homogenized bids” before and after the
format change, addressing endogeneity issues as well. Haile et al. (2006) control for auction specific variation
to create a set of bids as if they were from a sample of auctions of identical projects. We used these bids to
test if there are any remaining systematic differences in bidding behavior before and after the format change.
The results are available by the authors upon request.
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4 Discussion
Considering the set of asphalt projects offered for bid letting by the Oklahoma Department
of Transportation, we have shown that auctioning off all projects simultaneously has led to
a statistically significant increase in bids relative to the previous bid letting scheme where
half of the contracts were offered simultaneously in an AM session and half in a PM session.
Such patterns in an affiliated values framework could be attributed to informational effects.
Those effects are likely to be secondary here as asphalt contracts have primarily private costs.
Another explanation for the increased procurement costs can be found in the work by Krishna
and Rosenthal (1996). If potential synergies from undertaking multiple projects are low or
limited the sequential auction format can produce more competitive bids. Measuring the
intensity of synergies for projects offered within a month is not easy in practice. We have
identified, however, projects offered in the same division conjecturing that proximity can
reduce moving costs and create the opportunity to share resources more effectively across
projects. The larger the number of asphalt projects offered in the same division the larger
the potential of significant synergies. In our sample, of the 247 bids submitted in afternoon
sessions in Oklahoma before the format change only 50 bids (20.24%) are submitted by bidders
who bid for projects in the same division in the morning. Of the 85 contracts awarded in
afternoon sessions, only 9 morning winners (10.58%) had the ability to extract synergies by
winning projects in the same division. In that sense, we have not identified significant direct
effects across projects.13
Yet another explanation of the increase in bids post March 2002 could be provided in
the work by Feng and Chatterjee (2005) relying on low participation per auction and bidder
impatience. Table 11 considers the relative bids in auctions held in Texas and Oklahoma when
the number of bidders and potential participants per auction increases. The results suggest
that bids become more competitive in simultaneous auctions as the number of bidders or
plan holders increase or as the theory suggests, the sequential auction format produces higher
revenue when the level of competition is low.14 This factor is capturing only a small fraction
of the difference in bidding.
13We also isolated bidding behavior in Oklahoma road construction auctions involving asphalt work and
identified, within the simultaneous and sequential settings, synergies that could be realized by bidding for
multiple contracts in the same division within the same month. We differentiated between multiple bids in
AM sessions, multiple bids in PM sessions, multiple bids across sessions and multiple bids in the simultaneous
setting post March 2002. We didn’t find significant differences across formats.
14The assumption we are making here is that bidders can be somewhat impatient.
16
References
[1] Albano G, F Germano and S Lovo (2001). A comparison of standard multi-unit auction
with synergies. Economics Letters 71 (1): 55-60.
[2] Bajari P and L Ye (2003). Deciding between competition and collusion. Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 85 (4): 971-989.
[3] Bertrand M, E Duflo and S Mullainathan (2004). How much should we trust differences-
in-differences estimates? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (1): 249-275.
[4] Deltas G and T Jeitschko (2007). Auction hosting site pricing and market equilibrium
with endogenous bidder and seller participation. International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization 25 (6): 1190-1212.
[5] De Silva DG, A Kankanamge and G Kosmopoulou (2007). A change in timing of auctions
with synergies and its impact on bidding behavior. Economics Letters 95 (1): 60-65.
[6] De Silva DG, T Dunne, A Kankanamge and G Kosmopoulou (2008). The impact of
public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions. European Economic
Review 52 (1): 150-181.
[7] Feng J and K Chatterjee (2005). Simultaneous vs. sequential sales, intensity of competi-
tion, and uncertainty. Working paper, University of Florida and Penn State University.
[8] Goeree J and T Offerman (2003). Competitive bidding in auctions with private and
common values. Economic Journal 113 (489): 598-613.
[9] Haile P, H Hong and M Shum (2006). Nonparametric tests for common values in first-
price sealed-bid auctions. Working paper.
[10] Hausch D (1986). Multi-objects auctions: Sequential vs. simultaneous sales. Management
Science 32 (12): 1599-1610.
[11] Jofre-Bonet M and M Pesendorfer (2003). Estimation of a dynamic auction game. Econo-
metrica 71 (5): 1443-1489.
[12] Koenker R and G Bassett Jr (1982). Robust tests for heteroscedasticity based on regres-
sion quantiles, Econometrica 50 (1): 43-61.
17
[13] Krishna V and R Rosenthal (1996). Simultaneous auctions with synergies. Games and
Economic Behavior 17 (1): 1-31.
[14] Levin D and J Smith (1994). Equilibrium in auctions with entry. American Economic
Review 84 (3): 585-599.
[15] Li T and X Zheng (2009). Entry and competition effects in first-price auctions: Theory
and evidence from procurement auctions. Review of Economic Studies 76 (4): 1397-1429.
[16] Marmer V, A Shneyerov and P Xu (2007). What model for entry in first-price auctions? A
nonparametric approach. Working paper, University of British Columbia and Concordia
University.
[17] Milgrom P and R Weber (1982). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding. Econo-
metrica 50 (5): 1089-1122.
[18] Milgrom P and R Weber (2000). A theory of auctions and competitive bidding, II. In:
P Klemperer (ed.) The Economic Theory of Auctions Vol. 1 (Cambridge, UK: Edward
Elgar): pp. 179-194.
[19] Moulton B (1990). An illustration of a pitfall in estimating the effects of aggregate
variables on micro units. Review of Economics and Statistics 72 (2): 334-338.
[20] Palfrey T and S Pevnitskaya (2008). Endogenous entry equilibrium in first price private
value auctions: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
66 (3-4): 731-747.
[21] Porter R and J Zona (1993). Detection of bid rigging in procurement auctions. Journal
of Political Economy 101 (3): 518-538.
[22] Racine J and Q Li (2004). Nonparametric estimation of regression functions with both
categorical and continuous data. Journal of Econometrics 119 (1): 99-130.





Oklahoma Bids Dummy to identify the bids submitted for Oklahoma auctions.
Bids after March 2002 Bids submitted after March 2002.
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 Dummy to identify Oklahoma bids submitted after March 2002.
Log of bids Log value of bids.
Engineers cost estimate (ECE) The value of the pavement work bid items relative to the ECE.
Relative bid The value of the concrete work bid items relative to the ECE.
Relative winning bid Winning bid divided by the ECE.
Number of bidders The number of bidders in an auction.
Number of plan holders Number of plan holders in an auction.
Bidders capacity utilized The utilization rate is the current project backlog of a firm di-
vided by the maximum backlog of that firm during the sample
period. For firms that have never won a contract, the utilization
rate is set to zero. Data from the year 1997 are used to construct
a set of initial starting value for the capacity utilization variable.
The 1997 data is not used in the empirical models. The back-
log variable is constructed as follows. For each project awarded,
both the value of the contract and the length of the contract
in days are given. We assume that a project is completed in
a uniform fashion over the length of the contract. A contract
backlog is constructed in each month by summing across the
remaining value of all existing contracts in Texas and/or Okla-
homa for a firm. So for both Texas and Oklahoma firms, the
backlog includes all awarded projects in the states. As projects
are completed, the backlog of a firm goes to zero unless new
contracts are won.
Log number of days to complete the
project
Log number of days to complete the project.
Bidders distance to the project lo-
cation
The logarithm of the distance to a project is constructed as the
distance between the county the project is located in and the
distance to the county of the firm’s location [log(distance+1)].
The county location is measured by the longitude and latitude
at the centroid of the ‘county seat.’
Firm bidding on a division where
there is an ongoing project
This dummy variable identifies bidders when they are bidding
on projects where they have an ongoing project in the same
county.
Bidders with potential synergies This dummy variable identifies a morning session winning bidder
that is bidding in the afternoon session on given month.
Bidders with no potential synergies This dummy variable identifies a morning session losing bidder
that is bidding in the afternoon session on given month.
Multiple bids in the same division
in AM auctions
This dummy variable identifies a firm submitting multiple bids
in the morning session on given month in the same division.
Multiple bids in the same division
in PM auctions
This dummy variable identifies a firm submitting multiple bids
in the afternoon session on given month in the same division.
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Variable Definition
Multiple bids in the same division
in AM and PM auctions
This dummy variable identifies a firm submitting multiple bids
(at least one bid in the morning and afternoon session) on given
month in the same division before policy change.
Multiple bids in the same division
after March 2002
This dummy variable identifies a firm submitting multiple bids
on given month in the same division after policy change.
Average rivals winning to plan
holder ratio
The measure of rivals’ past average success (ARWP) in auctions
is constructed as the average across rivals of the ratio of past
wins to the past number of plans held. This variable incorpo-
rates two aspects of past rival bidding behavior. It incorpo-
rates both the probability of a rival bidding given they are a
plan holder and the probability the rival wins an auction given
that they bid. These probabilities are updated monthly using
the complete set of bidding data in Texas and Oklahoma. The
probabilities are initialized using data from 1997.
Closest rival’s distance to the
project location
This variable measures the distance (log of miles) between the
project location and the closest rival.
Rivals minimum backlog This variable contains the minimum the backlog of the rival
firms in an auction [log(backlog+1)]. See the capacity utilization




The monthly state-level unemployment rate in Oklahoma and
Texas from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Three month average of relative real
value of engineer’s estimates
This variable measures the three month moving average of the
real volume of all projects for Oklahoma and Texas. The real
volume of projects is constructed by adding the ECE across
projects up for bid in a month for Oklahoma and Texas, re-
spectively, and deflating the current value by the PPI. Then we
divide it by the average of the real volume for each state to
calculate the relative real volume.
Three month average of relative
number of building permits
This variable measures the three month moving average of the
relative number of building permits for Oklahoma and Texas.
The data come from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Monthly dummies Monthly dummies are set of 12 variables that control for the
months of the year. The omitted month is January.
Project location dummies ODOT has divided the state of OK into eight divisions. Sim-
ilarly TxDOT has divided TX into 25 divisions. The project
location dummies identify the 33 divisions from which we draw
data for our analysis. OK division 1 is the omitted group in the
Poisson regressions.
Table 8: Variable description.
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B Fixed effects and explanatory regressions
Relative bids
Variable (1) (2)
Oklahoma Bids (β1) .035 .042
(.053) (.053)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.053** -.059**
(.014) (.015)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .057** .061**
(.018) (.018)
Number of bidders -.013**
(.002)
Number of plan holders -.007**
(.002)
Firm bidding on a division where there is an Yes Yes
ongoing project
Number of Observations 6108 6108
Adjusted R2 .182 .177
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
All regressions are similar to runs in Table 3.
Table 9: Regression results with firm effects.
Relative winning bids
Variable (1) (2)
Oklahoma Bids (β1) -.037 -.027
(.082) (.079)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.018 -.025
(.023) (.024)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .066** .071**
(.028) (.029)
Number of bidders -.022***
(.003)
Number of plan holders -.011**
(.002)
Firm bidding on a division where there is an Yes Yes
ongoing project
Number of Observations 1427 1427
Adjusted R2 .381 .355
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
All regressions are similar to runs in Table 4.
Table 10: Regression results with firm effects.
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Relative bids
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Oklahoma Bids (β1) .010 .015 .010 .015
(.013) (.013) (.013) (.013)
Bids after March 2002 (β2) -.037** -.044** -.037** -.044**
(.018) (.021) (.018) (.021)
Oklahoma Bids after March 2002 (β3) .096*** .087*** .096*** .087***
(.031) (.024) (.029) (.024)
Number of bidders -.006** -.006**
(.002) (.002)
Number of bidders after March 2002 -.008*** -.008***
(.002) (.002)
Oklahoma number of bidders after -.015** (-.015**
March 2002 (.007) (.007)
Number of plan holders -.002 -.002
(.001) (.001)
Number of plan holders after -.004*** -.004***
March 2002 (.002) (.002)
Oklahoma number plan holders after -.008** -.008**
March 2002 (.003) (.003)
Firm bidding on a division where Yes Yes Yes Yes
there is an ongoing project
Bidders with potential synergies No No Yes Yes
Bidders with no potential synergies No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations 6175 6175 6175 6175
Adjusted R2 .043 .038 .043 .037
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level.
** denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Robust clustered standard errors using firm level clusters are in parentheses.
Table 11: Regression results.
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